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COLLECTIVE RIGHTS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
AFTER CARPENTER
DAVID GRAY ∗
In a landmark opinion, the Supreme Court held in Carpenter v. United
States 1 that government acquisition of cell-site location records from a cellular service provider is a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment requiring a warrant. 2 The majority opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts in support of that holding is not a model of lucidity. In fact, it seems
almost deliberately obscure at several critical junctures. Carpenter is far
from unique in this regard. The Court has a long history of mumbling when
it confronts new challenges or controversial social questions. Perhaps that is
as it should be. Vagueness at the vanguard preserves latitude for the Court
to construe its own precedents broadly or narrowly in response to subsequent
events and the facts of particular cases, refining and developing doctrine as
it goes along. It is therefore hard to criticize the Justices for preserving the
possibility of future humility at these moments of maximum hubris.
And who are we to complain anyway? This is just the sort of thing that
keeps law professors well-fed. The feast has certainly begun on Carpenter
with critics asking impertinent questions such as “What, precisely, is the government action that constitutes a ‘search’ when law enforcement requests
business records from a service provider?” 3 and “How, exactly, do customers
have Fourth Amendment ‘standing’ to challenge those requests?” 4 This Essay will answer both questions. The key, as we shall see, is that the Court
finally seems to be taking seriously the text of the Fourth Amendment, which
guarantees the right of “the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” 5 not, as the
Court often has assumed, a right of persons or individuals. 6 This shift in
© 2019 David Gray.
∗ Jacob A. France Professor of Law, University of Maryland, Francis King Carey School of
Law.
1. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
2. Id. at 2223.
3. Professor Danielle Citron and I squarely addressed this question in David Gray & Danielle
Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 133–37 (2013).
4. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2241–42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. I make the case for a collective rights reading of the Fourth Amendment at length in my
recent book. DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 134–89
(2017).
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focus is subtle, but critical, both as a matter of fidelity to the text and as a
way to light the path forward as the Court confronts law enforcement’s use
of new and emerging surveillance technologies.
I. FIRST HINTS: UNITED STATES V. JONES
The story starts in 2011 during oral argument in United States v. Jones. 7
In that case, law enforcement officers in Washington, D.C., had installed
GPS-tracking devices on vehicles possessed and operated by Antoine Jones
and Lawrence Maynard. Officers suspected that Jones and Maynard were
involved in a drug distribution conspiracy of significant dimensions. Agents
hoped to use the GPS devices to track their suspects’ movements in order to
find locations associated with the conspiracy and to look for evidence, additional suspects, and potential witnesses. The strategy was quite successful.
By tracking Jones and Maynard for almost a month, investigators found stash
houses and distribution centers. Agents were also able to document Jones’s
and Maynard’s making regular stops at these and other locations associated
with the conspiracy, providing valuable direct and corroborating evidence of
their participation.
Before trial, Maynard and Jones sought to suppress the GPS tracking
evidence and all the investigative fruits derived from that evidence. 8 By their
lights, the officers’ installation of those devices and their subsequent use of
the devices to conduct long-term surveillance constituted a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore required a warrant. Interestingly, the investigating officers seemed to have agreed at some point—or at
least worried at the outset that their conduct might implicate the Fourth
Amendment. That is evidenced by the fact that they sought and secured warrants to install and use the GPS trackers. Unfortunately, they failed to abide
by the terms of those warrants—allowing them to expire and, in the case of
Jones, installing the device in Maryland, outside the jurisdiction of the court
that granted the warrant. 9
The trial court in large part denied the motions to suppress. 10 The court
agreed that the officers violated the terms of their warrants. But, the court
ruled, those mistakes did not rise to the level of constitutional violations because the installation and use of GPS trackers was not a “search” for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, no warrant was required in the first
place. The warrants were gratuities—nice gestures, but not constitutionally

7. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
8. Id. at 403.
9. Id. at 402–03.
10. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 89 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). The trial court granted the motion only as to the short
periods of time when Jones’s car was parked in a garage adjoining his residence. Id.
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required. Violating the terms of those warrants was, therefore, of no legal
consequence. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied principally on the
“public observation doctrine.” 11 The public observation doctrine holds that
officers may conduct surveillance from any lawful vantage without encroaching upon Fourth Amendment rights. The theory promulgated by the Supreme
Court in support of the public observation doctrine is that when officers conduct observations from sidewalks, public roads, or public airspace, they are
doing no more than a member of the public might do and, therefore, are not
violating anyone’s reasonable expectations of privacy. 12 It follows that these
kinds of observations from public space are not “searches” for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment. The trial court’s reliance on the public observation
doctrine in Jones seemed to be particularly appropriate in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Knotts. 13
In Knotts, officers used a radio beeper device to track a container of
chemicals in an effort to find locations associated with a conspiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. During their surveillance, officers
used that device to track a coconspirator while he drove on public roads until
he stopped, eventually, at a cabin owned by Knotts. Writing for the Court in
Knotts, Chief Justice William Rehnquist held that “A person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his movements from one place to another.” 14 “The fact,” the Court continued, “that the officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance,
but also on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of [petitioner’s] automobile to the police receiver, does not alter the situation. Nothing in the
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and

11. For an explanation of the public observation doctrine, see GRAY, supra note 6, at 78–84.
Among the important cases in which the Court has elaborated the public observation doctrine are
Florida v. Riley, California v. Ciraolo, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, and United States v.
Knotts. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989) (holding that the police did not need a warrant
to inspect a backyard from a helicopter because the airways are public); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 215 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (“We hold that
the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a
search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)
(“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another.”).
12. The idea that “search” is defined as a violation of a reasonable expectations of privacy that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable traces to a concurring opinion written by Justice John
Marshall Harlan II in Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The
Court subsequently adopted Justice Harlan’s definition of search as its own. See GRAY, supra note
6, at 76–78. Of course, nobody without a law degree would define “search” in these terms. Most
folks would define “search” as inquiring, looking for, trying to find, seeking, etc. Much of the
current crisis in Fourth Amendment law can be traced to the Court’s decision to derogate from the
common public meaning of “search.” See GRAY, supra note 6, at 76–100, 158–60.
13. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
14. Id. at 281.
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technology afforded them in this case.” 15 Given the close technological kinship between the radio beeper used in Knotts and the GPS trackers used to
monitor Maynard and Jones, the Jones trial court quite reasonably found that
there was no “search,” that the officers were therefore not required to secure
a warrant in order to install and use the GPS tracking devices, and that the
officers’ failures to abide by the terms of their warrants did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. Ebullient, prosecutors relied on the GPS evidence at
trial and secured convictions against both Maynard and Jones. 16
Maynard and Jones appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, where they prevailed. 17 Writing for that
court, Judge Douglas Ginsburg acknowledged the public observation doctrine, but held that it has limits, and could not sanction continuous, long-term
surveillance “world without end.” 18 Judge Ginsburg grounded that holding,
in part, on what came to be known as the “mosaic theory.” 19 The idea is
simple and powerful. The kinds of short term and otherwise limited surveillance at issue in the cases that gave rise to the public observation doctrine
reveal very little and correspond with the kinds of limited interactions we
commonly have with other members of the public. It is not uncommon, for
example, to walk behind the same pedestrian for a few minutes or to follow
the same car on the highway for an hour, but these happenstance interactions
reveal very little about our fellow travelers.
By contrast:
Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed
by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly,
what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of
information can each reveal more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a
gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as
does one’s not visiting any of these places over the course of a
month. The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still
more; a single trip to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a
woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby
supply store tells a different story. A person who knows all of another’s travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a

15. Id. at 282.
16. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403–04 (2012).
17. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
18. Id. at 557.
19. Id. at 562. For discussions of the mosaic theory, see David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron,
A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 381–82 (2013); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012).
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heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.
....
A reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record of every time he drives his car, including his origin,
route, destination, and each place he stops and how long he stays
there; rather, he expects each of those movements to remain “disconnected and anonymous.” 20
Given its nature, duration, and extent, Judge Ginsburg held that the GPS
tracking conducted against Maynard and Jones violated their reasonable expectations of privacy, constituted a Fourth Amendment “search,” and required a valid warrant. The Government appealed to the Supreme Court.
Along the way, Maynard negotiated a resolution in his case, leaving Jones
alone before the Justices. 21 Representing the Government, Deputy Solicitor
General Michael Dreeben staked his argument on the public observation doctrine, prompting the following exchange with Chief Justice John Roberts:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think there would also not be a
search if you put a GPS device on all of our cars, monitored our
movements for a month? You think you’re entitled to do that under
your theory?
MR. DREEBEN: The Justices of this Court?
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes. (Laughter.)
MR. DREEBEN: Under our theory and under this Court’s cases,
the Justices of this Court when driving on public roadways have no
greater expectation of . . . .
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, your answer is yes, you could
tomorrow decide that you put a GPS device on every one of our
cars, follow us for a month; no problem under the Constitution? 22
At that point the argument was effectively over. The result was clear.
The Government had lost, impaled on the petard of absurdity. All that remained was the rationale. Before turning to the Court’s reasoning, however,
it is worth a moment’s pause to consider this exchange.
20. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562–63 (footnote omitted) (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
255 N.E.2d 765, 772 (1970) (Breitel, J., concurring)).
21. The procedural story here is interesting for those of us who find that sort of thing interesting. Among the points of particular interest is a dissenting opinion from the Circuit Court’s denial
of the Government’s petition for rehearing en banc written by then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh. In that
prescient opinion, Judge Kavanaugh argued that GPS tracking is not a search, but that installing a
GPS tracker on a private “effect” is a search insofar as it entails a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area for investigative purposes. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769–71
(2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). In advancing this position, Judge Kavanaugh predicted the majority opinion of the Court.
22. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (No. 10-1259).
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The Chief Justice caught some flak for this line of questioning. One
point of concern was that his question indicated a bias in favor of law enforcement in Fourth Amendment cases unless the nature of the threat is such
as to cause disquiet and insecurity among the Justices and their peers—in this
case, wealthy, privileged, white men. 23 When it comes to pretextual stops of
young, black men and challenges against racially skewed stop and frisk policies, the Court is uninterested. 24 But when it comes to police officers using
heat detection devices to determine when “the lady of the house takes her
daily sauna and bath” 25 or ignoring the sensibilities of social callers, 26 the
Court leaps into action. I would like to suggest a somewhat more charitable
reading.
As Chief Justice Roberts would recognize a couple of terms later, the
Fourth Amendment is tied to founding-era concerns about general warrants
and the threats they posed of broad and indiscriminate search. 27 The very
existence of general warrants threatened the security not just of those targeted
for searches and seizures, but, indeed, the people as a whole. 28 As I hear the
Chief Justice in this exchange, he is giving voice to those collective interests
by using himself and his colleagues as extreme examples. 29 “If you can track
us, then you can track anyone,” he might have said, “and if you can track
anyone, anytime, all the time, for any reason or for no reason at all, then
surely that violates the right of the people to be secure against threats of unreasonable search!” Although that sense of concern for the collective dimensions of Fourth Amendment rights did not decide the case in Jones, 30 the
Chief Justice tugged at an important thread—one that would become critical
to understanding the role of the Fourth Amendment in addressing new and
emerging surveillance technologies.
The Chief Justice did not assign himself the majority opinion in Jones.
That duty went instead to Justice Antonin Scalia who, writing for himself,
23. See, e.g., Tamara Rice Lave, Protecting Elites: An Alternative Take on How United States
v. Jones Fits into the Court’s Technology Jurisprudence, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 461, 461, 484–86
(2013).
24. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (declining to consider the subjective
intentions of police officers, including potential racial bias, when evaluating the constitutionality of
stops).
25. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001) (holding that the use of heat detection devices to monitor the interior of constitutionally protected areas is a “search”).
26. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (holding that police should respect the
rules of genteel social decorum by not entering a home when one resident has consented to a search
but the other has refused to consent).
27. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
28. GRAY, supra note 6, at 69–71, 154.
29. Id. at 114–15.
30. The Court ultimately held that the physical intrusion entailed in installing the GPS device
on Jones’s car was a “search.” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (“The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no
doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”).
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Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and
Sonia Sotomayor, held that the physical intrusion upon Jones’s “effect”—his
vehicle—for purposes of gathering information was a “search” subject to
Fourth Amendment regulation. 31 That holding was moderately exciting because it revitalized a thread of Fourth Amendment law all but abandoned
since the Court’s 1967 decision in Katz v. United States, 32 which famously
defined “searches” as violations of subjectively manifested expectations of
privacy that society is willing to recognize as “reasonable.” 33 But the truly
thrilling action came in concurring opinions written by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Samuel Alito.
Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, but wrote
separately to highlight her concerns with the exploitation of tracking technologies embedded in a range of consumer goods, including cars and
smartphones. 34 As Justice Sotomayor noted, surveillance conducted through
these devices might provide a “comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” 35 Moreover, the “government
can store such records and efficiently mine them for information years into
the future.” 36 “And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it
evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices:
‘limited police resources and community hostility.’” 37 Given these features,
Justice Sotomayor worried that granting government agents unfettered access
to the location information produced by these devices would “chill[] associational and expressive freedoms” and “alter the relationship between citizen
and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.” 38 In recognition of the fact that third parties routinely have access to some or all of this
location data, Justice Sotomayor concluded that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,” 39 thereby foreshadowing changes in not only the public observation doctrine, but the third
party doctrine as well. 40
31. Id.
32. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
33. The two-pronged reasonable expectation of privacy test is found not in the majority decision but in Justice John Marshall Harlan II’s concurring opinion. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 415.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 415–16 (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
38. Id. at 416 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Flaum, J., concurring)).
39. Id. at 417.
40. The third party doctrine holds that if a citizen shares information with a third party, then
they have no Fourth Amendment complaint if that third party subsequently shares that information
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There is a lot to think about in Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence,
but for present purposes I would like to emphasize two critical features. First,
she picks up the thread of Chief Justice Roberts’s question at oral argument,
making clear that Jones was not the primary party of interest in the case. 41
Rather, the main stakeholders were all of us. That concern for the collective
interests of “the people” is evident in the picture she paints of pervasive surveillance, the creation of what Professor Stephen Henderson has called
“Fourth Amendment time machines,” 42 and the effects of those threats on
associational freedoms and our democratic order. Second, she explicitly connects Fourth Amendment interests with fundamental political freedoms and
the proper relationship between the government and the governed in a democratic society. By failing to protect against threats of broad, indiscriminate,
and intrusive surveillance, she contends, the Court would leave unprotected
the core First Amendment rights of “the people” while allowing totalitarianism to enter through the backdoor. Fundamental to functioning democracy
is the role of the people as disciplinary observers of their government. In
democracies, the people watch the government. By contrast, a defining feature of totalitarian states is that the state is a disciplinary observer of the people. In totalitarian regimes, the government watches the people. Granting
broad, unfettered discretion for executive agents to use surveillance technologies would, Justice Sotomayor suggests, grant them authoritarian powers
characteristic of a totalitarian state.
Justice Samuel Alito also wrote an important concurring opinion in
Jones. 43 Writing for himself and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen
Breyer, and Elena Kagan, Justice Alito expressed surprise and concern with
the majority’s return to physical intrusion as a Fourth Amendment trigger.
As he read Katz and its progeny, the Court had long abandoned the link between search and trespass in favor of assessing reasonable expectations of
privacy. Why wake the dead? In addition, he worried about the inability of
a physical intrusion test to deal with the challenges posed by new and emerging surveillance technologies, many of which do not require anything like a
trespass. He therefore favored an interpretation of reasonable expectations
of privacy that would take into account the duration of the surveillance or,
perhaps, the quantum of information gathered. Specifically, he would have
with the government. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1979) (holding that people
willingly supply the numbers they dial to the phone company and thus have no expectation of privacy over those numbers); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 54 (1974) (holding that a
bank did not violate the Fourth Amendment when it gave a depositor’s records to the government);
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (holding that when a wrongdoer’s accomplice
records or transmits a conversation for authorities, no Fourth Amendment right has been violated);
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
41. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
42. Stephen Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines (and What They Might Say About
Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933, 937 (2016).
43. Jones, 565 U.S. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring).
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held that “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.” 44
II. WHAT TO MAKE OF JONES?
There was a bit of a feeding frenzy among law professors and other
commentators in the wake of Jones. Some were deeply critical. 45 Some were
elated. 46 But everyone was left to wonder where the Court would go next,
and why. Jones made clear that at least five Justices were ready to rethink
some of the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine, but there were few clues as
to what those changes might be or the constitutional theory that would support them. As law professors are wont to do, we took this as an invitation of
sorts. The Justices were seeking our advice. We responded. Some tried to
operationalize Justice Alito’s durational approach. 47 Some focused instead
on the nature of the information gathered 48 or its source. 49 Others suggested
that what mattered was how much information or data was gathered and the
“mosaics” revealed. 50 Dissatisfied with all of these options, Professor Danielle Citron and I argued that courts should focus on the new technologies
themselves, recognizing that the Fourth Amendment regulates the deployment and use of means and methods capable of facilitating programs of broad
and indiscriminate surveillance. 51 Then, we all waited to see what would
come next.

44. Id. at 430.
45. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 19.
46. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The Curious Case of United States v. Jones, 10
OHIO J. CRIM. L. 325 (2012).
47. See Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance
Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. P OL’Y 1, 16–
28 (2012) (creating a series of brightline durational thresholds dictating when law enforcement officers would need court approval to conduct surveillance).
48. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO
THIRD P ARTY RECORDS 25-4.1(a) commentary (3d ed. 2013) (explaining, for example, that medical
records are “highly private,” which means that law enforcement would need a judicial warrant to
access them but call records are only minimally or moderately private, so would require only official
approval by a command official or a subpoena); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1937–41 (2013).
49. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1185–94 (2016); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 616–37 (2015).
50. For a discussion of the mosaic approach and its promoters, see Gray & Citron, supra note
19, at 408.
51. Gray & Citron, supra note 3, at 82.
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III. EMERGING CONCERNS ABOUT COLLECTIVE RIGHTS: RILEY V.
CALIFORNIA
As the academic debate about Jones raged, the Court decided Riley v.
California. 52 The question presented in that case was whether the search incident to arrest rule applied to cellular phones. The search incident to arrest
rule allows officers effecting a lawful arrest to conduct a warrantless search
of an arrestee and areas and effects within his immediate reach and control at
the time of arrest. 53 Officers routinely rely on this rule to justify searches of
pockets, wallets, backpacks, and purses. But should that same rule allow
officers to search a cellular phone incident to arrest and without a warrant?
A unanimous Court held that it does not. But why? The answer is intriguing.
Writing for everyone except Justice Alito—who concurred—Chief Justice Roberts framed the question this way: “These cases require us to decide
how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones,
which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of
human anatomy.” 54 In the next few sentences he then explained that these
new technologies—cellular smartphones—have emerged from the “inconceivable” to become something “a significant majority of American adults
now own.” 55 The clear signal was that the Court was concerned not just with
Mr. Riley and similarly situated arrestees, but with all of us whose interests
were at stake due to the sheer pervasiveness of the technology. But it was
not just the “pervasiveness” of the technology that concerned the Court. It
was equally concerned about the nature of the technology and our relationship to it.
Unlike wallets, bags, and notebooks—mere “physical objects” that can
contain modestly finite amounts of information—smart phones “place vast
quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals.” 56 To
compare the search of wallets and bags to cellular phones, the Court continued, is a bit “like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable
from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B,
but little else justifies lumping them together.” 57 In both quantitative and
qualitative dimensions, smart phones are just different. They have “immense
52. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
53. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (holding that subsequent to a lawful arrest
in arrestee’s home, police may search arrestee and areas accessible to him in the room where he was
arrested, but may not search the rest of the house without a warrant or other justification); United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1950) (finding the search of arrestee and areas within his
reach at the time of his arrest in his office, including desk and filing cabinets, was reasonable and
did not require a warrant).
54. Riley, 573 U.S at 385.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 386.
57. Id. at 393.
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storage capacity,” capable of storing “millions of pages of text, thousands of
pictures, [and] hundreds of videos,” not to mention emails, contacts, and historical location data. 58 They are also conduits to even more data stored in
third-party servers. 59 Beyond the amount and diversity of data stored in or
directly accessible through cellular smartphones, the nature of that data raises
serious privacy concerns. That is because the kinds of data gathered, stored,
and accessed through smartphones is uniquely intimate—think Jeff Bezos 60—and also capable of painting a detailed account of a user’s life going
back months and even years. 61 Citing Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones, the Riley majority worried that information stored on
smartphones can reveal movements, associations, health information, and
more—concerns that affect each of us and all of us. 62
In the Chief Justice’s Riley opinion, we can see emerging the key features of the Court’s evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: First, the
Court puts the collective interest of the people front and center. What drives
the opinion is the ubiquity of cellular phones, the central role they have come
to play in daily life, and the intimate nature of our relationships with these
devices. To fail to afford phones the very highest levels of Fourth Amendment protection would, the Court implies, leave each of us and all of us insecure against threats of unreasonable searches in the same way that general
warrants and writs of assistance threatened the security of the founding generation. 63
And keep in mind the government’s position in Riley. Law enforcement
was not arguing that smartphones do not enjoy Fourth Amendment protection. To the contrary, it conceded that point. All the government wanted was
to have smartphones treated the same way as briefcases, purses, and other
portable “effects” commonly seized during lawful arrests. But the Court—
unanimously—rejected that not unreasonable position, granting cellular
phones the same Fourth Amendment status as homes.
Second, the Court adopted a technology-centered approach when analyzing the Fourth Amendment question presented in Riley. Although the
technology at issue was the object of the search rather than the means and
method of conducting the search, the Court’s focus on technology and the

58. Id. at 393–94.
59. Id. at 397.
60. Jim Rutenberg & Karen Weise, Jeff Bezos Accuses National Enquirer of “Extortion and
Blackmail,” N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/technology/jeff-bezos-sanchez-enquirer.html. A national paper obtained intimate pictures Mr. Bezos took of himself,
which he sent to his mistress. Those pictures were stored on his phone and hers as well as in cloud
back-up servers to which their phones were linked. Id.
61. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393–94.
62. Id. at 396.
63. Id. at 403.
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dimensions and extent of the threat posed to Fourth Amendment interests in
relation to the technology foreshadowed what was to come in Carpenter. 64
IV. CARPENTER, SEARCH, AND STANDING: COLLECTIVE RIGHTS IN THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Broadly, the issue in Carpenter was whether government agents need a
warrant to access the cell site location information (“CSLI”) gathered and
stored by cellular service providers. 65 CSLI is generated as cellular phones
maintain regular contact with provider networks. 66 Cellular companies routinely store this data. This means that those private companies have substantial and detailed records of users’ movements going back months or years.
But what was the constitutional question? As in many cases that come before
the Court, framing matters.
Echoing his question at oral argument in Jones and his majority opinion
in Riley, Chief Justice Roberts starts his majority opinion in Carpenter by
highlighting the collective interests at stake. “There are 396 million cell
phone service accounts in the United States,” we are told in the opening sentences, “for a Nation of 326 million people.” 67 Not only does almost everyone have a cellular phone, but we also carry them with us everywhere all the
time. 68 Why does this matter? Well, because the Fourth Amendment, Chief
Justice Roberts reminds us, was framed in response to concerns about general
warrants, writs of assistance, and the unfettered discretion they gave executive agents to search and seize. 69 Cast against this historical backdrop, the
Chief Justice explains, the Fourth Amendment is best understood as a proscription against “arbitrary power” and “too permeating police surveillance.” 70 As the Chief Justice notes, the Court has highlighted these collective interests in its recent cases dealing with new and emerging surveillance
technologies. As an example, he cites the Court’s opinion in Kyllo v. United
States. 71
64. Not to mention endorsing precisely the approach Professor Danielle Citron and I prescribed
in a series of articles published in the months after Jones. See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron,
Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV.
F. 262, 269–74 (2013); Gray & Citron, supra note 19, at 385–89; David Gray et al., Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 765–70 (2013); David
C. Gray, The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records:
Critical Perspectives from a Technology-Centered Approach to Quantitative Privacy, 66 OKLA. L.
REV. 919, 921–27 (2014).
65. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211, 2217, 2220–21, 2223 (2018).
66. Id. at 2211.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2218.
69. Id. at 2213; see also GRAY, supra note 6, at 160–65.
70. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (first quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886); and then quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)); see also GRAY, supra
note 6, at 264–75.
71. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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Kyllo dealt with the use of thermal imaging devices to gather evidence
about the interior of homes, and particularly hot-spots associated with the use
of high-powered lamps used to grow marijuana indoors. 72 On Chief Justice
Roberts’s telling, Kyllo, brought the use of thermal imaging devices under
Fourth Amendment regulation “[b]ecause any other conclusion would leave
homeowners ‘at the mercy of advancing technology.’” 73 The Carpenter
Court identified the same dangers in granting law enforcement unfettered access to CSLI. “[B]ecause location information is continually logged for all
of the 400 million devices in the United States—not just those belonging to
persons who might happen to come under investigation,” the Chief Justice
writes, “this newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone.” 74 Moreover, as the Court points out, because CSLI is gathered continuously and
stored for years, “police need not even know in advance whether they want
to follow a particular individual, or when.” 75 “Whoever the suspect turns out
to be,” the Court continues, “he has effectively been tailed every moment of
every day for five years, and the police may—in the Government’s view—
call upon the results of that surveillance without regard to the constraints of
the Fourth Amendment.” 76 As a consequence, “[o]nly the few without cell
phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.” 77
Although the Court is obviously feeling its way in Carpenter, it is
clearly focused on collective effects—in this case how CSLI can facilitate
invasive, pervasive, broad, and indiscriminate searches. In adopting this approach, the Court makes explicit what was implicit in the Chief Justice’s
question at oral argument in Jones: that the Justices are concerned about the
collective impact of granting government agents unfettered access and broad
discretion to deploy and use modern surveillance technologies. 78 Granting
such a license would allow “too permeating police surveillance,” leaving
each of us and all of us insecure against threats of indiscriminate surveillance
in ways similar to the threats posed by general warrants and writs of assistance. 79
So, going back to the beginning of this Essay, how does all of this help
the Court answer those two questions: “What, precisely, is the government
72. Id. at 29.
73. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35); see also GRAY, supra note
6, at 125.
74. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218; see also GRAY, supra note 6, at 252–54.
75. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
76. Id.; see also GRAY, supra note 6, at 270–71.
77. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
78. See GRAY, supra note 6, at 253.
79. Citron & Gray, supra note 3, at 70 n.46 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595
(1948)); see also id. at 85, 92, 95–99, 101, 144 (“In our view, the threshold Fourth Amendment
question raised by quantitative privacy concerns is whether an investigative technique or technology
has the capacity to facilitate broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance that raise the specter of
a surveillance state if deployment and use of that technology is left to the unfettered discretion of
government.”).
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action that constitutes a ‘search’ when law enforcement requests business
records from a service provider?” 80 and “How, exactly, do customers have
Fourth Amendment ‘standing’ to challenge those requests?” 81 The answer to
the first question—what was the “search”—is easy. Government agents in
Carpenter were inquiring, seeking, and trying to find where Carpenter was
by examining and looking through the documents and data provided by his
cellular service provider. 82 This is conduct that any competent English
speaker would identify as a “search.” 83 That includes our eighteenth century
forebears. 84 The fact that the agents were looking for Carpenter on public
streets does not make their conduct any less a “search.” The fact that one can
search in many places, inside and outside, in private homes and on public
streets, is in keeping with common law usage going back to, at least, 1658. 85
Moreover, as the Court recognized more recently, officers might “search the
wood for a thief.” 86 So, of course the agents in Carpenter were conducting a
search. The important question for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is
whether granting government agents unfettered discretion to conduct
searches using CSLI threatens “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 87 As the Fourth Amendment commands, this is a right that “shall not

80. Gray & Citron, supra note 3, at 133–37.
81. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2241–42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82. GRAY, supra note 6, at 251–52.
83. Id.
84. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001) (“When the Fourth Amendment was
adopted, as now, to ‘search’ meant ‘[t]o look over or through for the purpose of finding something;
to explore; to examine by inspection . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting N. WEBSTER, AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 66 (6th ed. 1989) (1828)); SAMUEL
JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, 1792) (defining search as, inter alia,
“To examine . . . to look through. . . . To inquire; to seek.”); see also GRAY, supra note 6, at 158–
60.
85. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT : ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL
MEANING 602–1791 320 (2009) (discussing English magistrates’ order commanding officers “‘to
make diligent search’ for able-bodied vagrants”); id. at 322 (discussing English magistrates’ report
describing “Rogues, Vagabonds, sturdy Beggars, and disorderly Persons apprehended by virtue of
search Warrants[,] in Night Houses and other disorderly Houses or such as infest the Streets in the
Night-time” (alteration in original)); WILLIAM SHEPPARD, THE OFFICES OF CONSTABLES,
CHURCH-WARDENS, OVERSEERS OF THE P OOR, SUPRAVISORS OF THE HIGH-WAYES, TREASURERS
OF THE COUNTY-STOCK; AND SOME OTHER LESSER COUNTRY OFFICERS, PLAINLY AND LIVELY
SET FORTH Chp. 8, § 2 (London 1658) (“[T]his Officer receiving a Hue and Cry after a Fellon,
must, with all speed, make diligent pursuit, with Horse and Foot, after the offendors from Town to
Town the way it is sent, and make diligent search in his own Town.”); THE CONDUCTOR
GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 197–98 (Phila.
1801) (noting the authority of a constable or sheriff to “search in his town for suspected persons”
and advising that “it is a good course to have the warrant of a justice of the peace when time will
permit, in order to prevent causeless hue and cry”).
86. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 n.1 (quoting N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 66 (6th ed. 1989) (1828)).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see GRAY, supra note 6, at 251–52.
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be violated,” 88 an imperative that can only be fulfilled by imposing prior restraints. 89 With these concerns front and center, the Court held that affording
law enforcement broad discretion to search using CSLI would leave each of
us and all of us—“the people”—vulnerable to intrusive, pervasive, and indiscriminate surveillance—just the sort of insecurity posed by the general warrants that inspired ratification of the Fourth Amendment in 1791. 90
The answer to the second question—how can Carpenter have Fourth
Amendment “standing” to challenge the search of business records kept by
his cellular service provider—is also easy: it is the wrong question to ask.
Or, at the very least, it is a question based on one or more false premises.
Take, as examples, the dissenting opinions of Justice Anthony Kennedy and
Justice Clarence Thomas in Carpenter. According to Justice Kennedy:
“Fourth Amendment rights . . . are personal. The Amendment protects ‘[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their . . . persons, houses, papers, and effects’—not the persons, houses, papers, and effects of others.” 91
Reprising this same theme, 92 Justice Thomas contends,
The Fourth Amendment specifies that the people have a right to be
secure from unreasonable searches of “their” persons, houses, papers, and effects. Although phrased in the plural, “[t]he obvious
meaning of [‘their’] is that each person has the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures in his own person,
house, papers, and effects.” . . . . Stated differently, the word
“their” means, at the very least, that individuals do not have Fourth
Amendment rights in someone else’s property. 93
In other words, the text does not mean what it says, it means the opposite of
what it says. 94
It is this silly bit of anti-textualism that is the source of the problem. As
folks like Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas see matters, the Fourth
Amendment is a constitutional specification of one of the sticks in the bundle

88. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
89. GRAY, supra note 6, at 166–69.
90. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2017).
91. Id. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
92. Because the more something is said, the truer it becomes.
93. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2241–42 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (citations
omitted) (first quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 92 (1998), and then citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008)).
94. Here, Justice Thomas quotes Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller for the proposition
that “the Constitution uses the plural phrase ‘the people’ to ‘refer to individual rights, not “collective” rights.’” Id. at 2242. Obviously. That is why we each have an individual right to the House
member of our choice, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, and an individual right to assemble, U.S. CONST.
amend. I. For a more detailed and serious—but still fun—critique of Justice Scalia’s off-handed
claim in Heller regarding the meaning of “the people” in the Fourth Amendment see David Gray,
Dangerous Dicta, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1181, 1184–85 (2015).
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of property rights: the right to exclude. 95 Another, alienation, comes along
(twice!) in the Fifth Amendment. 96 There is a certain Lockean quality to this.
After all, John Locke famously claimed that we have a natural right in ourselves, in the surpluses and improvements that result from our labor, and that
a condition of justice in the social contract is the legal recognition of that
right. 97 But the Bill of Rights is about much more than property rights. It is
also concerned with political rights: the right to assemble and petition the
government, 98 the preservation of unenumerated rights to the people, 99 and
the reservation of undelegated rights to the people. 100 And this too is very
Lockean. Locke imagined not one contract but two leading to the formation
of just states. 101 First, individuals exit the state of nature by entering into a
social contract forming a nation or a people. 102 Second, that people enters a
political contract with its government. 103 And who, by the very terms of the
United States Constitution, enters into a political contract to form a more perfect union, etc.? “We, the individual persons residing in the United States?”
Of course not. It is, instead, “We, the People of the United States” who entered into the contract of political government described thereafter. 104
So, the Fourth Amendment means what it says. It guarantees a right “of
the people.” Not a right “of persons.” If James Madison and his colleagues
in the First Congress meant for the Fourth Amendment to guarantee rights
“of persons,” then they would have written it that way. They certainly had a
ready model in Article Fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,

95. Because the Third Amendment was not enough to make the point. See U.S. CONST. amend.
III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner . . . .”). “My home is my castle! You cannot live here unless I so consent. In fact, you can’t
even come in! Okay, you can, but only if it’s not unreasonable. And my person, my papers, and
my effects are also my castle. Okay, my person is my temple, but you get the point. And, at any
rate, temples are protected too! Just look at the First Amendment.”
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V. “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
97. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, Chap. IX, § 124 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., 1980) (1690) (“The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and
putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state
of nature there are many things wanting.” (emphasis added)).
98. U.S CONST. amend. I.
99. U.S CONST. amend. IX.
100. U.S CONST. amend. X.
101. LOCKE, supra note 97, at Chap. VIII, § 106 (“[T]he beginning of politic society depends
upon the consent of the individuals, to join into, and make one society; who, when they are thus
incorporated, might set up what form of government they thought fit.”).
102. GRAY, supra note 6, at 144–46.
103. Id.
104. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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which provides that “[e]very subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures.” 105 And they demonstrably knew how to assign rights to individuals when they wanted to, as they did in the Fifth 106 and
Sixth Amendments. 107 But they chose to assign Fourth Amendment rights to
“the people,” which can only be read as a reference to “the people,” perhaps
aspirationally, cited in the Preamble. 108 Read in this light, the Fourth Amendment is not a defense of individual property rights. It is, instead, a restraint
on government power—a restraint designed to preserve the independence
and integrity of the people as a whole. 109 It is a bulwark against tyranny. 110
The collective nature of the Fourth Amendment is even more evident
when we consider the precise nature of the right it enshrines. The Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit searches and seizures. It does not even prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Instead, it guarantees a right “to be
secure” against unreasonable searches and seizures. It commands that “the
people” shall live in a state free from fear of being the targets of unreasonable
searches and seizures—and particularly searches and seizures wielded as
tools to punish disfavored political and religious groups. 111 Viewed from this
perspective, the Fourth Amendment is not particularly concerned with individual searches and seizures as such, or rights violations suffered by individual victims of those searches. 112 After all, those individuals can vindicate
their own rights through civil actions. 113 The Fourth Amendment is instead
concerned with the general threat to the people arising from claims of government power inherent in those individual events—the maxims of tyranny
expressed in those actions. 114 As Lord Camden put the point in Huckle v.
Money 115 (one of the “General Warrants” cases identified by Justice Thomas

105. MASS. CONST. art. XIV. This provision of the Massachusetts Constitution was first
adopted in 1780, seven years before the constitutional convention and eleven years before the Fourth
Amendment was ratified.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .” (emphasis added)).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”(emphasis added)).
108. GRAY, supra note 6, at 148.
109. Id. at 146–56.
110. Id. at 156, 168–69; see also Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 444 (2007) (“The Fourth Amendment . . .
erects a wall between a free society and overzealous police action—a line of defense implemented
by the framers to protect individuals from the tyranny of the police state.”).
111. CUDDIHY, supra note 85, at 122–23; GRAY, supra note 6, at 157–58; Laura K. Donohue,
The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1208–10 (2016).
112. See generally David Gray, The Fourth Amendment Categorical Imperative, 116 MICH. L.
REV. ONLINE 14, 24–31 (2017).
113. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758–59
(1994).
114. Gray, supra note 112, at 14.
115. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763).
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in Carpenter as reflecting what “the founding generation considered ‘the true
and ultimate expression of constitutional law’”) 116:
[T]he small injury done to the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness
of his station and rank in life did not appear to the jury in that striking light in which the great point of law touching the liberty of the
subject appeared to them at the trial; they saw a magistrate over all
the King’s subjects, exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna
Charta, and attempting to destroy the liberty of the kingdom . . . . 117
The security of the people is threatened whenever anyone, no matter
“his station,” is the target of an unreasonable search or seizure. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly recognizes the collective interests at stake in these particular events and commands the enforcement of measures sufficient to guarantee our collective security. 118
With these minor clarifications in mind, let us revisit the majority opinion in Carpenter that Justices Kennedy and Thomas attack. Early on, the
Court identifies two “basic guideposts” drawn from “historical understandings” of the Fourth Amendment. 119 “First, that the Amendment seeks to secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’” 120 Second, “a central
aim of the Framers was ‘to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating
police surveillance.’” 121 As is outlined above, the Court then goes on to explain how collective interests in securing privacy and guarding against threats
of pervasive surveillance have guided the Court’s treatment of contemporary
116. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2239 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886)).
117. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769; see also Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (1765)
(“[W]e can safely say there is no law in this country to justify the defendants in what they have
done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society . . . .”); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng.
Rep. 489, 498 (1763) (noting that granting “discretionary power . . . to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall . . . certainly may affect the person and property of every
man in this kingdom”); James Otis, Speech on Writs of Assistance 1761, in AMERICAN HISTORY
LEAFLETS No. 33 15–16 (Albert Bushnell Hart & Edward Channing eds. 1906) (attacking general
warrants as “destructive of English liberty” because they grant “a power, that places the liberty of
every man in the hands of every petty officer”).
118. GRAY, supra note 6, at 166–69.
119. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214.
120. Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). Worth noting is that the
Boyd Court relies, paraphrases, and quotes heavily from Lord Camden’s opinion in Entick v. Carrington, another of the General Warrants cases. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627–29 (quoting Entick v.
Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tri. 1030 (KB) 1063–67). When introducing the section of his
opinion whence the Boyd Court draws inspiration, Lord Camden clearly identifies that what is at
stake in sanctioning a claim of unfettered executive authority to search and seize, is that:
the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to
the search and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall think fit
to charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a seditious
libel.
Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 How. St. Tri. 1030 (KB) 1063. What makes this particularly important is its claim to the general interests of “every subject.”
121. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
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surveillance technologies. For example, in Kyllo its required government
agents to secure warrants before using thermal imagers to detect infrared radiation emanating from homes “[b]ecause any other conclusion would leave
homeowners ‘at the mercy of advancing technology.’” 122 Similarly, in Riley
the Court required that officers obtain a warrant before searching the data on
cellular phones because the devices are ubiquitous, having become virtual
fifth appendages for most Americans, and in light of “the vast store of sensitive information” they contain. 123 To hold otherwise, the Court noted in Riley, would be to ignore the pervasive threat posed to the ninety percent of
American adults who own cellular phones if those phones were open to police
scrutiny “on a routine basis,” 124 a result, the Court suggested, that would be
akin to granting general warrants and writs of assistance, the opposition to
which was “one of the driving forces behind the Revolution itself.” 125
As the Carpenter Court recognized, allowing government agents unfettered access to CSLI implicates general, collective interests that are protected
by the Fourth Amendment. Cellular phones are ubiquitous, to the point that
there are more cellular service accounts with United States carriers than there
are people. 126 Moreover, most people “compulsively carry cell phones with
them all the time . . . beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.” 127 This means that granting unfettered government access to
CSLI can facilitate programs of “near perfect surveillance, as if [the government] had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.” 128 Of course we
are all already wearing those ankle monitors all the time. As a consequence,
[P]olice need not even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular individual, or when.
Whoever the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively been
tailed every moment of every day for five years, and the police
may—in the Government’s view—call upon the results of that surveillance without regard to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless
and absolute surveillance. 129
What this shows is that the majority in Carpenter was keenly aware that
the real party in interest in the case was “the people” as a whole. What was
at stake was “the tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also everyone
122. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001)).
123. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014)).
124. Riley, 573 U.S. at 395.
125. Id. at 403.
126. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211 (noting “[t]here are 396 million cell phone service accounts
in the United States—for a Nation of 326 million people”).
127. Id. at 2218.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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else’s, not for a short period but for years and years.”130 Failing to impose
Fourth Amendment restraints on government access to CSLI would therefore
leave the people insecure against threats of broad and indiscriminate surveillance—exactly the kind of “permeating police surveillance” the Fourth
Amendment was designed to prevent. 131
Now, at last, we can understand how badly Justices Kennedy and
Thomas missed the mark when they accused the Court of indulging collective
rights to grant Carpenter “standing” to assert a property interest in his service
provider’s papers. The Court did indeed rely on the fundamentally collective
nature of Fourth Amendment rights when deciding to regulate government
access to CSLI, but it did not do so in order to expand the doctrine of Fourth
Amendment “standing.” Instead, it took note of the collective interests at
stake in searches of CSLI to determine whether these kinds of searches fall
within the regulatory compass of the Fourth Amendment. The quite reasonable question the Court asked was whether granting government agents unfettered access to this particular means of conducting searches would compromise the security of the people against unreasonable searches by
facilitating programs of broad and indiscriminate search. 132 In answer to that
question, the Court held that “[i]n light of the deeply revealing nature of
CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and
automatic nature of its collection,” it must “decline to grant the state unrestricted access to a wireless carrier’s database of physical location information.” 133 It instead imposed a warrant requirement, which is the Fourth
Amendment’s preferred prospective remedy, and one that is particularly
well-suited to the regulation of tracking technologies, in part because they
are most likely to be used in the context of discrete investigations. 134
V. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS AND THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH
GOING FORWARD
The academic debate about Carpenter is well under way with scholars
and critics trying to understand what the Court did, why, and where it is likely
to go from here. This Essay has attempted to answer the “what” and “why”
question. In essence, the Court held that “the threshold Fourth Amendment
question . . . is whether an investigative technique or technology has the capacity to facilitate broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance that raise
the specter of a surveillance state if deployment and use of that technology is

130. Id. at 2219.
131. Id. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
132. Id. at 2223; see also Gray & Citron, supra note 3, at 71–72 (proposing this approach to
Fourth Amendment cases involving emerging surveillance technologies).
133. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
134. GRAY, supra note 6, at 251–57; Gray & Citron, supra note 3, at 105–12.
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left to the unfettered discretion of government.” 135 It grounded this rule in
the Fourth Amendment right “of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures,” 136 rightly emphasizing the collective dimensions of that right. So where do we go from here?
I expect that we will see a steady stream of challenges targeting new and
emerging search methods and surveillance technologies. As these cases
come to the Court, the Justices are likely to ask questions about the intrusiveness of the searches these technologies facilitate, the scalability of the technology, and the costs associated with its deployment and use. 137 Applying
these and other factors, the Court will find that there is no threat associated
with allowing law enforcement officers full discretion to use traditional
means and methods such as human surveillance and radio beepers. The Court
is also likely to find that some technologies must be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation. Here, I think it is quite likely that the Court will impose
constitutional restraints on RFID tracking, cell site simulators, tower dumps,
drones, Big Data, and efforts to access data stored on third party servers (the
“Cloud”). 138 What will be more interesting is the form of those restraints.
To date, the Court has endorsed only one prospective remedy in Fourth
Amendment cases: the warrant requirement. But there is nothing in the text
or history of the Fourth Amendment to support the proposition that probable
cause warrants are the only way to guarantee the security of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 139 The Government had an opportunity on this front in Carpenter. Rather than staking its position on the
claim that CSLI tracking is not a “search,” the Government might have conceded that it is a search, but could have then maintained that Section 2703 of
the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) 140 is sufficient to guarantee that the
government is not tracking most people, most of the time, through their cellular phones. Although Section 2703(d) orders do not require probable cause,
and certainly do not have a particularity requirement, the Government could
have argued that the 2703 framework reflects a considered legislative view
and strikes a reasonable balance among the interests at stake, guarding
against “unreasonable” searches. The Court may well have been skeptical,
but this would certainly have been an interesting argument. But the door is
far from closed. At least since Jones, the Court has been very interested in
legislative and executive solutions to the privacy and security challenges
135. Gray & Citron, supra note 3, at 101.
136. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
137. Gray & Citron, supra note 3, at 102.
138. See generally GRAY, supra note 6, at 249–75.
139. See id. at 203–04.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). Section 2703 requires court orders, but not warrants, for investigators to access electronic communications records, which, by consensus and general practice,
encompasses CSLI. 2703(d) orders are issued when the government can show “that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records
or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” Id.
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posed by new and emerging technologies. 141 That interest remains. I suspect
that the Court would be favorably disposed to more bespoke arrangements
than a warrant requirement. 142 So what will happen next? The ball, it seems
to me, is in the court of the political branches.

141. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
142. For some examples of these kinds of arrangements, see GRAY, supra note 6, at 249–94.

